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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ENGINEERING COMMISSION, .D.
H. WHITTENBURG, Chairman, H.
J .. CORLEISSEN and LAYTON
MAXFIELD, Members of the Engineering Commission,

I

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

vs.

7939

FRED TEDESCO and KLEA
TEDESCO, his wife, et al.,

B.

Defendants,

and
BIRD & EVANS, Inc.,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
'7

This case comes to the Court upon plaintiff's petition
for an intermediate appeal. Stated generally, the problem
is one of construing the statute which forms the basis for
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the creation of the state park known as the "This Is The
Place" Monument. The present appeal is one phase of the
suit to condemn the park lands brought against a number
of land-owners whose separate claims for just compensation have been litigated or settled one by one.
Among these separate claims is that presented herein
by defendant. The theory is that, in law, damage was done
to land lying entirely outside park boundaries because, it
is said, the legal effect of the statute creating the park was
the closure of Kennedy Drive, a road passing through the
park which is the only connection of defendant's land with
the state highway. The trial court adopted defendant's
theory. It is the correctness of that basic ruling that is
challenged here.
The parties to the appeal are referred to in this brief
as they were in the proceedings below. A map .of the park
and defendant's adjoining land, showing the course of
Kennedy Drive, is attached at the end of the brief. References to the record are to the numbers stamped in red
at the bottom of each page, .and not the reporter's typewritten numbers.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1951 the legislature passed an act authorizing the
creation of "This Is The Place" Monument. The act, now
Sec. 63-11-10, U. C. A. 1953, has been twice amended. The
course of the legislation is traced below.
At the general session, 1951, the legislature enacted
Sec. 8, Ch. 75, Laws of Utah 1951, which read:
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"The engineering commission is hereby granted
the power to condemn for state park purposes any
and all lands in the vicinity of the 'This Is the Place'
monument as shall be deemed necessary to preserve the historical significance of said monument
and the natural beauty of the area surrounding the
same and including all of the following described
tract:
"Commencing 2 rods north from the center of
Section 11, Township 1 south, range 1 east, Salt Lake
Meridian, and running thence West, 2,205 feet ;
thence north 0 o 54' east 300 feet; thence north 89 o 6'
west 437.7 feet; thence north 202.02 feet more or less
to the Wasatch Bonneville Boulevard; thence northerly along said boulevard to the U. S. Military Reservation; thence north 86 rods; thence .east 228 rods;
thence south 524 feet; thence east 416 feet; thence
south 361 feet; thence south 52° West 528 feet;
thence northwesterly to a point 1,497 feet north
of the point of beginning; thence south 1,497 feet to
the place of beginning; less a tract sold to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company containing
- approximately .1147 acres, and less a tract sold to
Salt Lake City Corporation containing approximately 7.63 acres."
An amendment to the act was passed at the first special
session. The amended act, Sec. 1, Ch. 13, Laws of Utah
1951, First Special Session, reads as follows:
"The engineering commission is authorized and
directed to forthwith condemn, in behalf of the State
of Utah, for state park ·purposes the following described lands:
"a. Commencing 2 rods north from the ·center
of Section 11, Township 1 south, range 1 east, Salt
Lake Meridian, and running thence west 2,205 feet;
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thence north 0°54' east 300 feet; thence north 89°06'
west 437.7 feet; thence north 202.02 feet more or
less to the Wasatch Bonneville Boulevard ; thence
northerly along said boulevard to the U. S. Military
Reservation; thence north 86 rods ; thence east 228
rods; thence south 524 feet; thence east 416 feet;
thence south 361 feet; thence south 52<l west 528
feet; thence northwesterly to a point 1,497 feet
north of the point of beginning ; thence south 1,497
feet to the place of beginning, less a tract sold to
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
containing approximately .1147 acres, and less a
tract sold to Salt Lake City Corporation containing
approximately 7.63 acres.
"b. Any additional land in the vicinity of said
monument, as the. engineering commission shall
deem necessary to preserve the historical significance of same."
The legislature in 1953 passed S. B~ No. 86, which expressly excludes from condemnation the easement held for
State Route 65 (which is the main highway to Henefer),
and Kennedy Drive. The act now reads:
"The engineering commission is authorized and
directed to forthwith condemn, in behalf of the State
of Utah, for state park purposes the following described lands:
"a. Commencing 2 rods north from the center
of Section 11, Township 1 south, range 1 east, Salt
Lake Meridian, and running thence west 2,205 feet;
thence north 0°54' east 300 feet; thence north 89°06'
west 437.7 feet; thence north 202.02 feet more or
less to the Wasatch Bonneville Boulevard; thence
northerly along said boulevard to the U. S. Military
Reservation; thence north 86 rods; thence east 228
rods; thence south 524 feet; thence east 416 feet;
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thence south 361 feet; thence south 52 ° west 528
feet; thence northwesterly to a point 1,497 feet
north of the point of beginning ; thence south 1,497
feet to the place of beginning, less a tract sold to
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
containing approximately .1147 acres and less a
tract sold to Salt Lake City Corporation containing approximately 7.63 acres, and less a tract
known as Kennedy Drive, containing approximately 3.29 acres, near the south side of the above
described tract running in a southerly and easterly
direction from a City street to the southeast corner
of the above described tract of land. Nothing herein
provided shall be construed so as to require the closing or abandonment of that part of State Route 65
which lies within the boundaries hereinabove described, or so as to affect the present easement held
by the State Road Commission of Utah for purposes
of maintaining State Route 65.
"b. Any additional land in the vicinity of said
monument, as the engineering commission shall
deem necessary to preserve the historical significance of same.
·
"Section 2. This act shall take effect upon approval."
On July 10, 1951, the Engineering Commission adopted
a resolution instructing the Attorney General to proceed
with condemnation of the land described in the statute (R.
4-17). The resolution, which was incorporated into the:
Attorney General's complaint, divided the tract into 28
parcels held by different owners, all of whom were named
as defendants.
Defendant Bird & Evans, Inc., was named a party to
the original complaint because of its ownership of Parcel
No.7, lying within park boundaries. But it should be noted
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that Parcel 7 is not involved here. After a trial, a jury
made its award of $66,000 for the taking of Parcel 7 (R.
26-27); that judgment has been paid, and the final order
of condemnation was entered by the court as to that tract
on March 21, 1952 (R. 29-30). The land which is the subject of this action "is an entirely separate tract lying outside the park; it is not Parcel 7, and is not contiguous with
Parcel 7.
On Aprill, 1952, the trial court permitted defendant to
file a cross-complaint (R. 20-22). It is there alleged that
the taking of the park lands does damage to a tract which
lies outside park boundaries. The theory is that plaintiff,
by the condemnation of Parcel 28, will close Kennedy Drive,
which is described in paragraph 3 of the cross-complaint as
"the only practical access road to" defendant's land. Alternatively, it was pleaded that if Kennedy Drive were to
remain open, damage to a lesser degree would nevertheless
be inflicted upon defendant's land. The latter theory has
been abandoned, however (R. 79).
Pursuing its first theory, defendant moved to make
parties of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, because the
fee simple in Kennedy Drive was held by one or the other
(R. 31). The motion was granted (R. 32-34) and those
two parties appeared, the County filing a disclaimer (R. 38)
and the City answering (R. 35-37). It appears from the
City's unchallenged answer, and the Court knows judicially, that City boundaries now extend east sufficiently far
to include the land in question, and that Kennedy Drive is
a city street the fee simple to which is held by the City.
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Two hearings before the lower court have been had on
defendant's claim. The first hearing, on 0ctober 28, 1952,
was devoted to oral argument upon defendant's motion to
make co-defendants of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County. A transcript of the argument was designated as part of
the record on appeal (R. 41-66). As indicated above, defendant'~ moti<;>n was granted, the trial court indicating its
acceptance of defendant's theory that the statute itself was
an act of condemnation and that the Engineering Commission had no discretion to leave Kennedy Drive untouched
and uncondemned. (See particularly the trial court's remarks at R. 64-65.)
The cause came on for trial on December 1, 1952. A
jury was selected and sworn (R. 68), and then excused during arguments on motion (R. 71). The court denied a
motion to dismiss (R. 79) and defendant then made its
. election as to the theory on which it intended to proceed.
The words of counsel are :
"MR. RAMPTON: * * * So we are electing, as
we have to elect, to go to trial on the theory that
Kennedy Drive is closed; that is, the right to go
over it is taken away from us and we proceed to
trial on that theory- and ask damages on that basis."
I

Plaintiff then moved to dismiss on the ground that the
statute was not an act of condemnation and that Kennedy
Drive remained open (R. 79). After argument the motion
was denied (R. 90) .
..

The following passages ~ave .been extracted from the
transcript as being indicative of the ruling of· the court as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

to the basis upon which the matter was to have been submitted.
"THE COURT: Let's see, the motion is made to
dismiss on the ground that the legislative act is not
an act of condemnation? (R. 90).
"MR. ALSTON: That is right, Your Honor.
. "THE COURT: The motion will be denied.
"MR. ALSTON: Having denied that motion I
assume that the· Court has now, or will make, an
order that the act itself is an act of condemnation.
"THE COURT: Well, I think that would be the
natural following of such a ruling" (R. 91).

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"MR. ALSTON: May I ask Your Honor for a
clarification as to when the order of condemnation
is effective? Is it, is the effective date the date of
the act or the effective date of the resolution?" (R.
91, 92).
"THE COURT: As indicated by Mr. Rampton
of course you have the two statutes of our state.
"MR. ALSTON: Chapter 75 and then Chapter
13.
"THE COURT: Well, you have the one passing
the legislative act condemning the property. Then
you have the procedural act which indicates the date
of the service of summons is the effective date of the
condemnation. I think the law requires that I, if
possible, give effect and force to both statutes and
I see nothing in the 1952 session that would repeal
our general condemnation law, that the effective
date is the date of the service of summons. So I
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would say for that reason and giving effect to both
statutes that July 12, 1951 would be that date.
"MR. ALSTON: Is that for the determination
of damages?
"THE COURT: Yes. That would be for the determination of dam~ges and I presume that is really
the only thing that is at issue here.
"MR. ALSTON: Well, I hate to labor the issue.
Your Honor. I am trying to find out if Your
Honor is giving an order that the act, Chapter 75,
Laws of 1951, as amended by Chapter 13, Laws
of 1951, Special Session, is an act of condemnation?
"THE COURT: Yes, I have·so ruled on that.
Now you have asked me when did it take effect and
my answer as to that is that July 12, 1951, would be
the effective date.
'
"MR. ALSTON: May the record show that the
plaintiff takes exception to the order of the Court?
"THE COURT: Yes. The record may so show."
This Court should be aware of two further facts. It
clearly appears from the record that the Engineering Commission does not intend physically to close Kennedy Drive
unless ordered to by the courts (R. 86). It is fair to say that
all parties made arguments on that assumption and that the
lower court made its ruling on that assumption.
It also appears that during the trial of the damage issue
for the taking of Parcel 28; owned by the Deere Estate, it
was stipulated between counsel for the trustees of Deere
Estate and counsel for the Engineering Commission that
for purposes of that trial Kennedy Drive would not be con-
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sidered · closed, the right of the trustees to proceed for further damages in the event of such closure being reserved
(R. 75).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM IS ACTUALLY A
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM AND AS
SUCH IS BARRED BY RULE 13 (a), U. R. C. P.
POINT II.
THE STATUTE WAS NOT, IN AND OF ITSELF, A LEGISLATIVE CONDEMNATION OF
KENNEDY DRIVE BECAUSE
(A) THE LANGUAGE USED AND THE
CIRCUMSTANCES NEGATE ANY SUCH
INTENT.
(B) THERE NEVER HAS BEEN A DETERMINATION THAT PARK USE IS A
MORE NECESSARY PUBLIC USE THAN
USE AS A PUBLIC WAY.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM IS ACTUALLY A
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM AND AS
SUCH IS BARRED BY RULE 13 (a), U. R. C. P.
The record shows that this case was commenced and
summons served on July 11, 1951, and that defendant, Bird
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& Evans, Inc., was one of the original defendants. Bird &

Evans, Inc., owned the tract designated Parcel 7 in the;
complaint. As defendant, it filed an answer to the complaint and thereafter a trial before a jury was had on
November 26 and 27, 1951. A verdict for $66,000 was rend-ered and judgment entered thereon; the judgment was paid
and a final order of condemnation was entered on March 21,
1952. Not until April 1, 1952, did defendant file the plead. ing entitled "cross-complaint" which is the subject matterof the intermediate appeal now before this court.
Although this document is entitled cross-complaint, it
is no more than an ordinary counterclaim subject to the new
Rules of Civil Procedure as to counterclaims. Plaintiff's
contention is that it was filed too late.
Rule 13 (a) reads as follows:
"A pleading shall ,state as a· counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving· the pleading
the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not be so
stated if at the time the action was commenced the
claim was the subject of another pending action."
"

We believe that the cross-complaint filed by defendant
is squarely covered by this rule. Under defendant's theory·
of the case, the taking of all monument lands was effectuated by the passage of the statute. That was the "transac-
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tion or occurrence" which was the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint; all of defendant's claims arose at that
time. The adjudication. of the claim does not require the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction, defendant having demonstrated this
by its insistence that Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County
be joined. And there was no other action pending. The
Rule is drafted in broad language, so as to include "any
claim," and defendant does not escape the operation of the
Rule simply by mis-labelling its pleading as something other
than a counterclaim. It plainly is not a cross-complaint.
Since adoption of the New Rules, one case has dealt
with Rule 13 (a), Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, (Utah 1952)
246 P. 2d 609. That was a suit on open account for gas, oil
and supplies delivered over a four-month period. The defendant invoked Rule 13 (a) because of a prior separate
action instituted by Winegar against the plaintiff therein
for negligence in installing an oil sump. This court said:
"Anent defendant's contention that all items of
the open account should have been pleaded as a
compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13 (a) in defendant's negligence suit against Olson, it is obvious that the $11.06 charged for parts used in installing the oil sump is the only item that arose 'out
of the transaction or occurrence' the subject matter
of defendant's negligence claim against Olson. The
latter having failed to plead the item as a counter
claim in such action is precluded from including it
here, or in any other action, as is held by the authorities interp1·eting the rule 6 (Italics added) .
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(Footnote 6 of the court's opinion reads: "Ake
v. Chancey, 5 Cir., 149 F. 2d 310; Pennsylvania R.
Co. v. Musante-Phillips, Inc., D. C., 42 F. Supp. 340;
1 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed. Prac. and Procedure, Sec.
394.")
Plaintiff therefore urges that, under defendant's theory
of the case, the claim herein arose out of the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise to its claim on account
of the taking of Parcel 7. This claim, not having been
pleaded at the time of the answer claiming damages for
Parcel 7, is therefore barred.

POINT II (A)
THE STATUTE WAS NOT, IN AND OF ITSELF, A LEGISLATIVE CONDEMNATION OF
KENNEDY DRIVE BECAUSE
(A) THE LANGUAGE USED AND THE
CIRCUMSTANCES NEGATE ANY SUCH
INTENT.
The lower court ruled that the statute (Sec. 63-11-10,
U. C. A. 1953) by its own operation and without any further
proceedings, constituted a condemnation of Kennedy Drive.
The result, the court held, was that the fee simple underlying this street was taken from the City and tha~ the public easement for passage was extinguished.
It may be admitted that proceedings taken by state officers pursuant to a statute may so hamper a land-owner in
his enjoyment of property that a "taking" is the result. 2
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Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., § 6.1 [1]. It appears from the record however that there never has been in
fact any physical closure of the road. Defendant does not
base its claim upon an actual appropriation or upon any
physical dealings with the Drive or with defendant's land.
The taking of Kennedy Drive, defendant says, occurred as
soon as the statute became law. The taking was by operation of law, entirely on paper. Plaintiff contends that the
statute alone could not possibly so have operated.
It is said in a recent text, 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., §6.13:
"The mere passage of legislation authorizing
the acquisition of property by eminent domain is
ordinarily not sufficient in and of itself to constitute
a taking [Citations]. Where, however, the provisions of the statute and the circumstances under
which the appropriation is to take pla.ce are such as
to indicate that the purpose of the law was to effect
a taking by virtue of the statute itself, it has been
held that a statute may be so construed as to vest
title in the condemnor upon the mere passage of the
law" [Citations].
The reason why legislation alone does not ordinarily
operate as a taking has been set forth by the U. S. Supreme
Court in Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 84 L.
Ed. 240, 60 S. Ct. 231. In that case, land was taken for a
flood-way to relieve pressure on levees along the Mississippi
River in high-water times. The legislation involved was the
Flood Control Act of 1928 (33 U. S. C. A. §§ 702a - 702m,
704), which, in effect, put Congressional approval upon
plans and maps submitted by the Army Engineers. Among
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the points i~ the case was a contention by Danforth that the
taking occurred at the time the Act was passed. The similarity of Danforth's arguments with those advanced by defendant herein should be noted. The court said ( 84 L. Ed.,
.at 246 and 247) :
"Petitioner seeks interest on the judgment from
the time of the taking or appropriation of the flowage easement. Petitioner fixes this appropriation
at the time of the enactment of the Flood Control
Act of May 15, 1928, on the theory that the passage
of that act diminished immediately the value of this .
property because the plan contemplated the ultimate
use of the floodway. Alternatively the date of the
_ taking is fixed by petitioner as of October 21, 1929,
when work began on the set-back levee or October 31,
1952, when the set-back levee was completed."

*

*

*

*

*

"This leaves for consideration the contention
that there was a taking by the enactment of the legislation, when work began on the set-back levee or
when that levee was completed. The mere enactment of legislation which authorizes a condemnation
of property cannot l;le a taking. Such legislation may
be repealed or modified, or appropriations may
fail." 22
(The Court's footnote 22 reads: "Willink v.
United States, 240 U. S. 572, 60 L. Ed. 808, 36 S.
Ct. 422; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 596, 42 L.
Ed. 270, 290, 17 S. Ct. 966; United States v. Sponenbarger, this day decided [308 U. S. 256, 60 L. Ed.
230, 60 S. Ct. 225] .")
The soundness of the rule laid down in the Danforth
case is most aptly illustrated by the action of the 1953
legislature in expressly declaring Kennedy Drive and State
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Route 65 not to be included as lands which the Engineering Commission was instructed to condemn.
It is to be noted that t.he language of the U. S. Supreme
Court is that legislation authorizing condemnation "cannot
be a taking." The present case does not, of course, require
a holding that a legislative act of condemnation is an impossibility ; the only holding required on these facts is that
this particular enactment did not operate as such. A reading of the statutes pursuant to which the complaint herein
was filed shows it to be very unlikely that the legislature
thought of its action as constituting a taking.
~

.

The act of the general session (Sec. 8, Ch. 75, L. '51)
"granted the power" to proceed, the commission being instructed to include all of a described tract plus whatever
other land in the vicinity it should deem appropriate.
Amended language inserted at the special session (Sec.
1, Ch. 13, L. '51, 1st S. S.) altered the enactment from a
mere grant of power tQ an explicit command to proceed
"forthwith." The land described in the amendment remains
the same: the described tract plus whatever other land
should be deemed appropriate. Presumably, the lower court
read the change of language as constituting a change of
legislative attitude from one of permission to one of command, and it must be admitted that the general tone of the
language in the two statutes differs. But a reading of the
altered language as expressing a legislative determination
to appropriate Kennedy Drive back to its former wild state
as park land so as to deny the existing public easement for
travel, is somewhat extravagant; and defendant must go

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
even further so as to contend that the legislative intent was
that the transformation occur right at the time of the
passage of the act.
The first act was merely a grant of power to proceed,
which implies discretion in the commission as to the period
of time within which action had to be taken. The second
statute became an explicit instruction to proceed "forthwith." That word means: "Immediately; without delay;
hence, within a reasonable time ; promptly and with reasonable dispatch." (Webster's New International Dictionary,
2d Ed., unabridged.) If any legislative intention is evi-denced by the· change of language, it is that the legislature
did not want any delay about the setting up of the park.
The altered language is indicative only of an intent to get
the project moving. The commission was directed, in effect,
to make up its mind as to what lands should be included
within the park boundaries and then to proceed promptly
to acquire them.
There are obvious difficulties standing in the way of
the interpretation which defendant would put upon the
statute. Delegated to the commission was a discretionary
power to condemn additional appropriate land in the vicinity
of the park. It is puzzling to conceive how these additional
lands, the whereabouts of which were not decided upon
when the act was passed, could have been taken by the
legislature. Defendant's position is such that it must assert
the theory that the legislative intent was to effectuate a
taking at that time of land even though the legislature did
not know where the land was. The unlikelihood of the no-tion appears from a mere statement of it.
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There is another difficulty with defendant's concept:
Whatever the legislature intended with respect to Kennedy
Drive was also necessarily intended for the main state highway to Henefer, Route 65. The highway, as appears from
the map, passes through the center of the park. The described tract includes a segment of the highway as well as
a segment of Kennedy Drive, and it clearly appears from the
later passage of S. B. No. 86 that the two roads have always
been thought of alike. If the statute closed Kennedy Drive
then it also closed the main state highway. No other conclusion is possible. To· argue that the legislature intended
to close up the state highway and to forbid motorists to
drive through it is to attribute to the legislature intentional
folly. Legislative intent is often elusive, but plaintiff feels
that at least it is safe to attribute to the legislature the lack
of any intent to deny the public right to pass along a main
.state highway.
There is much authority holding that courts will not
impose upon a statute a construction which yields an unreasonable or absurd result. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, §§ 377,
·378. The statute here involved is silent as to whether it was
intended to be presently operative as a taking, and such intention ought not to be read in by implication, as was done
below.
POINT II (B)
THE STATUTE WAS NOT, IN AND OF ITSELF, A LEGISLATIVE CONDEMNATION OF
KENNEDY DRIVE BECAUSE
(B) THERE NEVER HAS BEEN A DETERMINATION THAT PARK USE IS A
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MORE NECESSARY PUBLIC USE THAN
USE AS A PUBLIC WAY.
A familiar principle in the law of eminent domain is
that land already in public use cannot be condemned and put
to a different public use unless the new use is more necessary. The rule has been incorporated into the law of our
state by Sec. 78-34-4 (3), U. C. A. 1953, which reads:
"Before property can be taken it must appear:
* * * (3) if already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which it is to be applied
is a more necessary public use."
Another basic principle is that the question of what
constitutes a public use is judicial and not legislative.
/ "Although the legislature in the fi1"St ~nstance
has the power to determine the question of public
use [citations], it has no power to determine finally
the extent of its own authority over private property, and the question whether a use for which the
legislature has authorized the taking of property
· by eminent domain is really public is ultimately a
judicial one" [citations]. 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 7.4.
The latter principle is expressed by Utah statute, see
Sec. 78-34-8 (1), U. C. A. 1953, and by case law. In Town
of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P. 2d 343, this court
said:
"Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 7333, provides,
'Before property can be taken it must appear; 1.
That the use to which it is to be applied is a use
authorized by law; 2. That the taking is necessary
to such use.' And in section 7338, 'The court ·or
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judge thereof shall have power: 1. To determine the
conditions specified in Sec. 7333.' Whether the property is being taken for a use authorized by law, that
is, a public use, is by statute in this state, and by the
general rule of law, a judicial question and may be
inquired into by the courts." 4 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) 366; 10 R. C. L. 29.
It follows from reading these two principles together
that it is a judicial problem to determine which of two
public uses is more necessary. This conclusion is expressed
in our statutes. 78-34~8 (1) U. C. A. 1953 provides:
"The court or judge thereof shall have power:
( 1) to determine the conditions specified in Sec.
78-34-4; * * * "
Section 78-34-4, subsection 3, is the statute which provides that land devoted to a public use cannot be appropriated for a different public use unless the new use is more
necessary.
In other words, the assertion that one public use is
more necessary than another is one that can be made with
legal finality only by the courts. As a consequence the
legislature was simply without power to pass a statute having the final legal effect of appropriating Kennedy Drive
from a public street and making it over into a portion of a
public park. Even had the statute contained express language so asserting, the taking could not have occurred when
defendant says it did.
A holding that the legislature was entirely without
power to appropriate Kennedy Drive is not the only way
for thi& court to dispose of this case. Such a holding would
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be sound legally. But an alternative solution of the problem would be the recognition that, entirely aside from any
question of power, there was no actual intent by anyone
involved to taken Kennedy Drive.
The Engineering Commission's· resolution contained no
declaration that park use is more necessary than road. use;
the complaint, and even the cross-complaint, contained no
such allegation ; the lower court made no such finding.
And the legislature was silent with respect to any declara..:.
tion that park use is the more necessary (at least there was
silence until S. B. No. 86 declared to the contrary). To attempt to distill out of that silence an implied, conscious,
"legislative intention" so to declare (as defendant must in
order to succeed) is to pursue an illusion. For, .in simple
fact, there was not a "legislative intention" with respect to
Kennedy Drive one way or another. The existence of the
roads involved in this case and the effect upon them of the
passage of the act was something that the legislature, or the
legislators, just did not thirik about, until 1953.
If that is so, and plaintiff respectfully urges that any
other conclusion would not be realistic, then the error of
the lower court becomes obvious. The legislature not only
lacked power to assert with finality that Kennedy Drive
was taken for a more necessary public use; the legislature
did not even attempt to make the assertion.
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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff rests its case on these deductions from principles of law set forth in the argument:
Defendant came to court too late, its claim being one
which under the Rules had to be pleaded as a compulsory
counterclaim in the original answer demanding compensation for the taking of Parcel 7.
If the case be treated on the merits, defendant is also
barred. The theory upon which defendant proceeded is unsound because there is ascribed to the legislature an "intent" it never had, and because the "intent" was one which
the legislature was powerless to effectuate even had it desired to. The legislature did not consciously intend, by the
statute alone, to take Kennedy Drive. And it did not intend
any declaration that park use of the land under the street
is more necessary than use as a public way. Finally, even
had the legislature so intended, and so declared, there is no
legislative power to do what defendants says has been done.
The legislature did not want to take Kennedy Drive and,
acting alone, could not have done so had it wanted to.
The lower court's ruling should be reversed, and the
case should be remanded with instructions to dismiss.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General
ROBERT B. PORTER, .JR.,
Assistant A ttoTney General
JOHN W. HORSLEY,
Assistant Attorney General
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